
















































burning	on	health.	 It	exploits	variation	 in	 sugarcane	burning	 in	Brazil	 to	 identify	 the	effect	of	
pollution	from	biomass	burning	on	respiratory	morbidity.	The	second	and	third	essays	investigate	
how	politics	play	a	role	in	defining	the	quality	and	quantity	of	local	health	and	school	services.	In	
particular,	 the	 second	 essay	 looks	 at	 whether	 variation	 of	 representation	 in	 the	 Brazilian	
Chamber	of	Deputies	can	explain	differences	in	local	output	of	local	public	goods	and	services.	
The	 third	 and	 last	 essay	 investigates	 whether	 term-limits	 affect	 the	 performance	 elected	
politicians	in	terms	of	the	quality	of	local	health	care	services	and	schools	provided.	Connecting	
all	three	essays	is	the	fact	that	they	all	relate	to	Brazil	and	analyze	different	factors	that	influence	
the	quality	of	health	 locally.	Below	are	the	title	and	 individual	abstracts	 for	each	of	the	three	
essays.	
Chapter	1:	Biomass	Burning	and	Health:	The	Case	of	the	Brazilian	Sugarcane	Industry	
Brazil	has	a	 long	tradition	 in	growing	sugarcane,	a	 feedstock	used	to	produce	both	sugar	and	
ethanol.	 Over	 the	 past	 decade,	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 advent	 of	 flex-fuel	 cars,	 production	 has	
increased	sharply.	However,	this	monoculture	has	brought	several	concerns,	one	of	which	is	air	
pollution.	Although	harvesting	technology	has	advanced,	the	practice	of	pre-harvest	burning	is	
still	 common.	 Using	 geographic	 information	 system	 and	 remote	 sensing	 data	 on	 sugarcane	
burning	 together	 with	 Brazilian	 public	 health	 information	 on	 respiratory	 morbidities	 at	 the	
municipal	level,	this	paper	estimates	the	effects	of	sugarcane	biomass	burning	on	health.	Two	




sugarcane	 fields	 nearby	 leads	 to	 a	 0.23%	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 children’s	 respiratory	
morbidities.	Moreover,	 during	harvesting	months,	municipalities	 that	have	 sugarcane	 in	 their	
surrounding	on	average	present	more	cases	of	respiratory	morbidities	than	municipalities	further	
away	from	sugarcane	plantations.	This	research	contributes	to	the	growing	literature	on	ambient	






This	 paper	 investigates	 the	 impact	of	 political	 representation	on	 the	 local	 provision	of	 public	
goods	and	services.	By	exploiting	variation	across	terms	in	the	number	of	elected	deputies	in	the	
Brazilian	lower	chamber	associated	with	municipalities,	this	research	investigates	whether	this	









counterparts	 that	 were	 not	 re-elected.	 A	 fixed	 effects	 model	 that	 captures	 variation	 in	
representation	 within	 municipalities,	 but	 controls	 for	 all	 unobservable	 time	 invariant	
characteristics,	shows	that	there	is	a	positive	partial	effect	of	political	representation	on	health	










on	elected	politicians’	performance.	The	prediction	 is	 that	term-bounded	 incumbents	shirk	or	
engage	 in	 opportunistic	 behaviour.	 Klašnja	 and	 Titiunik	 (2017)	 investigate	 Brazilian	 mayoral	
elections	and	find	that	term-bounded	mayors	in	weak	parties	spend	less	on	health,	education	
and	social	assistance	programs.	Using	data	from	Brazilian	local	elections	since	2000	and	a	rich	set	
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Biomass	burning	 is	a	major	 source	of	air	pollution.	 From	 its	 incomplete	combustion,	biomass	
burning	generates,	among	other	products,	carbon	monoxide	(CO)	and	particulate	matter	(PM)	
that	 endanger	 health	 (Brauer,	 1999).	 In	 particular,	 PM	measuring	 10	micrometers	 or	 less	 in	
diameter	that	is	inhalable	causes	many	respiratory	complications	due	to	its	ease	in	reaching	lower	
respiratory	airways.1	Exposure	to	CO,	on	the	other	hand,	impairs	the	blood’s	capacity	to	circulate	
oxygen,	 thus	 causing	 a	 variety	 of	 diseases,	 including	 respiratory	 morbidities.	 Most	 types	 of	
biomass	burning	are	anthropogenic	and	are	often	linked	to	agricultural	practices.	In	some	parts	
of	 the	 world,	 one	 form	 of	 biomass	 burning	 is	 the	 burning	 of	 sugarcane	 to	 facilitate	manual	
harvesting.	This	eliminates	the	fields	from	unwanted	animals	like	snakes	and	scorpions	and	frees	




environment,	 particularly	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 (Searchinger,	 et	 al.,	 2008),	 soil	










































the	 analysis	 to	 states	other	 than	 São	Paulo	where	 sugarcane	 is	 also	 important	 and	 to	 longer	
periods.	GIS	 together	with	 remotely	 sensed	 data	 based	 on	 satellite	 images	 and	 heat	 sensors	
enable	one	to	measure	the	extent	and	the	occurrence	of	sugarcane	burning	near	urban	centers,	
irrespective	 of	 political	 boundaries.	 Two	 different	 sets	 of	 remotely	 sensed	 data	 are	 used	 to	
provide	an	alternative	and	improved	proxy	for	monthly	variations	in	air	quality	due	to	sugarcane	
burning	in	the	years	2003	-	2012,	and	across	all	municipalities	of	6	states	which	together	account	
for	over	80%	of	 total	production	of	 sugarcane	 in	Brazil.5	The	 first	 is	yearly	data	on	sugarcane	










sensors.6	To	account	 for	wind	direction,	only	 fire	occurrences	 that	occur	 in	 the	municipality’s	
surrounding	area	in	which	the	prevailing	wind	is	coming	from	are	considered.	
In	this	study,	Poisson	regression	models	are	used	to	estimate	health	semi-elasticities	with	respect	
to	 air	 pollution	 from	 sugarcane	burning.	 Together	with	monthly	 data	 on	municipal	 counts	 of	
respiratory	 morbidity	 and	 infant	 mortality,	 fire	 occurrences	 on	 sugarcane	 fields	 surrounding	
municipalities	are	used	to	associate	air	pollution	from	biomass	burning	with	health.	Fixed	effects	






Paulo	 to	 reduce	 sugarcane	 burning	 significantly	 since	 2006	 by	 replacing	 manual	 harvesting	
practices	with	mechanical	harvesters.	Lastly,	the	sugarcane	production	cycle	in	Brazil	allows	one	
to	exploit	variation	in	sugarcane	burning	within	years.	Because	sugarcane	burning	only	occurs	







Fixed	 effects	 models	 are	 used	 to	 account	 for	 unobserved	 heterogeneity.	 Municipal-specific	
variables	 could	 be	 correlated	 to	 health	 outcomes	 and	 sugarcane	 burning.	 A	 municipal’s	
surrounding	terrain,	for	instance,	could	determine	both	sugarcane	burning	and	health	outcomes.	
Fields	 with	 steep	 slopes	 are	 not	 mechanizable7	 and	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 experience	 change	 in	
sugarcane	burning,	but	at	the	same	time	can	create	natural	barriers	to	air	pollution.8	Another	
potential	 cause	 for	 caution	 that	 is	municipal-specific	 and	unobserved	 is	 related	 to	household	
sorting.	There	are	many	reasons	for	households	and	firms	to	sort	geographically.	Households	that	
strategically	opt	to	reside	far	from	sugarcane	fields	are	also	likely	to	be	more	cautious	about	their	
health.	 Not	 controlling	 for	 these	 permanent	 issues	 pertinent	 to	municipalities	would	 lead	 to	
biased	estimates.	A	full	set	of	year	and	calendar	months	dummies	is	also	included	to	control	for	

























































state	of	São	Paulo	 (De	Moraes	&	Zilberman,	2014).	To	this	day,	sugarcane	 is	one	of	 the	most	






leader	 in	 the	 production	 of	 sugar,	 only	 in	 the	 1970s	 after	 the	 price	 of	 oil	 skyrocketed	 did	
sugarcane	 regain	 primacy	 due	 to	 its	 importance	 in	 the	 production	 of	 ethanol.	 A	 successful	




subsidies	 came	 to	 an	 end,	 production	 of	 ethanol-fueled	 vehicles	 practically	 stopped	 and	




mainly	 market-driven.	 There	 have	 been	 no	 specific	 government	 subsidies	 to	 sugarcane	 and	
ethanol	 producers	 as	 before	 (Goldemberg,	 Coelho,	 Nastari,	 &	 Lucon,	 2004).	 Total	 sugarcane	















Figure	 1.2	 highlights	 this	 expansionary	 trend	 for	 Brazil	 and	 the	 top	 8	 States	 that	 produce	
sugarcane	 (the	 six	 States	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 1.1	 plus	 two	 Northeastern	 states,	 Alagoas	 and	
Pernambuco).	Together	these	8	states	accounted	for	92.2%	of	the	national	production	in	2012	
and	 São	 Paulo	 alone	 produced	 53%	of	 Brazil’s	 2012	 production.13	 The	 critical	 acceleration	 in	
production	occurred	 in	 the	years	after	2005	and	 is	only	pertinent	 to	the	Central	South	States	
except	Mato	Grosso.	Due	to	the	establishment	of	agro-ecological	zoning	in	2009	(Decree	6,961	
of	September	17th)	that	prohibits	new	expansion	of	sugarcane	fields	in	the	Amazon	biome,	Mato	


















There	 have	 been	 efforts	 to	 inhibit	 sugarcane	 burning	 practices	 in	 Brazil.	 Responding	 to	
international	 and	national	 concerns	 over	 the	negative	 impacts	 on	 local	 communities	 and	 the	
environment,	 the	 State	 of	 São	 Paulo’s	 established	 in	 2007	 an	 Agri-Environmental	 protocol	














in	 both	 the	 average	 of	 the	 total	 area	 of	 sugarcane	 burning	 across	 all	municipalities	 and	 the	
proportion	of	actual	burned	area	relative	to	the	average	total	acreage	of	sugarcane	plantations,	
(Figure	 1.3).	 From	 2006	 to	 2009,	 because	 the	 share	 of	 burned	 area	 presents	 a	 more	 acute	
downward	trend	than	the	absolute	area	of	burned	sugarcane,	this	indicates	that	much	of	the	fall	
in	 the	 percentages	 of	 sugarcane	 burning	 is	 related	 to	 the	 new	 fields	 of	 sugarcane	 adopting	
















Good	 measurement	 of	 pollution	 is	 a	 concern	 in	 this	 study,	 as	 the	 few	 pollution-monitoring	


















19	 Urban	 centers	 are	 considered	 here	 to	 be	 the	municipal	 city	 centers,	 as	 defined	 by	 the	 Brazilian	 Institute	 of	





















of	 Ribeirão	 Corrente	 what	 is	 the	 considered	 area	 of	 sugarcane	 plantation	 to	 measure	 fire	



















































Panel	 (C)	 provides	 summary	 statistics	 on	 the	 counts	 of	 fire	 occurrences	 used	 to	 measure	















Two	 alternative	 estimation	 strategies	 are	 proposed	 to	 link	 sugarcane	 burning	 to	 health	
outcomes.	 Because	 health	 outcomes	 such	 as	 respiratory	 morbidity	 and	 infant	 mortality	 are	
measured	 as	 counts	 and	 therefore	 are	 nonnegative,	 the	 choice	 for	 linear	 models	 is	 not	




𝔼 𝐻 𝑿 = 	exp(𝑋′𝛽).	
1.4.1.	Poisson	fixed	effects	models	
Poisson	 fixed	 effects	 models	 are	 used	 to	 account	 for	 municipal-specific	 unobserved	 het-	
erogeneity.	In	such	models,	fixed	effects	are	multiplicative	in	the	conditional	mean.	Formally,	the	
following	regression	is	estimated		
(1)	 	 𝔼 𝐻)* 𝐹)*, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝜂) = 	 𝜂)exp(𝛽0𝐹)* +	𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊𝒕)	
where	𝐹)*is	 the	 count	 of	 fire	 occurrences	 on	 sugarcane	 fields	 surrounding	 municipality	 𝑖,	 in	
month-year	𝑡,	and	𝑿𝒊𝒕	is	a	vector	of	covariates	which	include	weather	variables,	number	of	cars,	
and	dummy	variables	for	calendar	months	and	year.	The	covariates	𝑿𝒊𝒕are	expected	to	capture	






























26	 In	 this	 case	 the	 marginal	 effect	 is	 6𝔼 𝐻)* 𝐹)*, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝜂)
789
	= 	 𝜂)exp(𝛽0𝐹)* + 	𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊𝒕)𝛽0,	 and	 consequently	 𝛽0 =	
6𝔼 𝐻)* 𝐹)*, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝜂)
789
𝔼 𝐻)* 𝐹)*, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝜂) :0.	
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age	 cohorts	 is	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 isolating	distinct	 behavioral	 patterns	 and	 capturing	 varying	
effects	across	age	groups.	By	looking	at	the	effects	across	age	groups	separately,	as	in	the	case	
of	 children,	 one	 is	 essentially	 controlling	 simultaneously	 for	 children’s	 differing	 biological	
developments	 and	 their	 parents’	 naturally	 varying	 efforts	 to	 protect	 them	 (Neidell,	 2004).	
Therefore	it	is	expected	that	the	effects	differ	across	age	groups.		
1.4.2.	Harvesting	months	
An	alternative	model	 that	exploits	 the	production	cycle	of	 the	sugarcane	 industry	 in	Brazil	 to	
identify	 sugarcane	 burning	 is	 considered.	 Because	 burning	 occurs	 almost	 exclusively	 during	





data	on	 fields	 that	were	burned	 from	2006	 to	2012	 for	 the	 state	of	 São	Paulo.	 Formally,	 the	
following	Poisson	regression	model	with	the	interaction	term	is	considered:	
(2)	 	 𝔼 𝐻);< 𝐷)<, 𝑅;, 𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒚, 𝜂) = 	exp(𝛿0𝑇);< +	𝛿C𝑅; + 𝛿D𝐷)< +	𝜹𝟒𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒚),	
where	𝑇);< = 𝐷)<	×	𝑅; ,	𝐷)<	indicates	if	municipality	𝑖	has	sugarcane	fields	nearby	in	year	𝑦,	
and	𝑅;	indicates	if	month	𝑚	is	a	harvesting	month.	In	a	linear	model	𝛿0	would	be	the	coefficient	
of	 interest,	 as	 it	 would	 capture	 the	 double	 difference	 from	 across	municipalities	 and	 within	
municipalities	over	the	months	in	a	DD	model.	In	a	Poisson	model,	however,	the	interpretation	
is	not	as	obvious,	although	 the	 sign	of	𝛿0	 remains	 the	 same	as	 the	 treatment	effect	 (Puhani,	
2012).	Because	in	the	Poisson	model	the	outcome	variable	is	bounded	below	at	zero,	the	effect	
of	𝐷)<and	𝑅;is	not	constant	across	the	groups	and	time	periods.	The	treatment	effect	is		𝜏 =






error	 term.	 Although	 behavioral	 attitudes	 towards	 pollution	 change	 over	 time,	 the	 abrupt	
alterations	in	sugarcane	burning	over	different	municipalities	are	plausibly	not	correlated	to	any	
behavioral	change	in	health	investments.	 In	fact,	they	have	much	more	to	do	with	exogenous	






graphical	 analysis	 are	 presented.	 Figure	 1.7(a)	 highlights	 the	 seasonal	 aspect	 of	 pollution	 by	
showing	the	trend	of	PM	measuring	less	than	10	micron	in	diameter	in	municipalities	where	there	
is	either	a	strong	or	a	weak	presence	of	sugarcane.27	In	Jaú’s	surrounding,	a	significant	number	
of	 sugarcane	 fields	 are	 burned,	 whereas	 in	 São	 José	 dos	 Campos	 there	 are	 no	 sugarcane	
plantations.	Both	cities	present	distinct	seasonal	patterns	of	PM;	 in	São	José	dos	Campos	the	
spikes	 in	 PM	 during	 the	 harvesting	 period	 are	 less	 significant	 than	 those	 observed	 in	 Jaú.	
Moreover,	during	non-harvesting	months,	Jaú	presents	much	lower	levels	of	PM.	Figure	1.7(b)	
highlights	the	variation	in	sugarcane	burning	across	months	by	plotting	the	total	number	of	fire	
occurrences	 in	 the	 State	 of	 São	 Paulo	 detected	 by	 the	 satellite	 TERRA	 over	 sugarcane	 crops	
throughout	the	same	years.	Although	there	are	positive	counts	of	occurrences	in	months	other	
than	March-November,	there	are	clearly	more	fire	detections	during	harvesting	months.	
To	 document	 the	 seasonal	 pattern	 in	 respiratory	 morbidities,	 Figure	 1.8(a)	 plots	 monthly	
respiratory	 morbidity	 over	 time	 for	 São	 Paulo.	 During	 the	 harvesting	 months,	 respiratory	
morbidity	rates	are	above	average.	This	trend,	however,	should	be	observed	with	caution.	Other	
factors	 that	 influence	health	cannot	be	 ruled	out.	For	example,	weather	conditions	may	be	a	
factor	since	some	of	the	harvesting	months	coincide	with	the	winter	months.	To	highlight	the	

















from	harvesting	months	 to	 non-harvesting	months.	 This	 adjusted	measure	 of	 the	 respiratory	
morbidity	prevalence	rate	clearly	increases	for	municipalities	with	sugarcane	burning,	whereas	
in	the	case	of	non-burning	municipalities	there	 is	a	small	decrease	going	from	non-harvesting	





























in	 health	 outcomes.	 A	 third	 degree	 polynomial	 function	 of	 monthly	 temperature,	 relative	
humidity	 and	 precipitation,	 and	 number	 of	 cars	 are	 added	 to	 account	 for	 other	 potentially	
confounding	environmental	factors.	
Columns	1	and	2	of	Panel	(A)	show	estimates	of	the	semi-elasticity	of	respiratory	morbidity	with	
respect	 to	 biomass	 burning	when	 considering	 all	 ages.	 Differently	 from	Column	 1,	 Column	 2	
presents	estimates	without	calendar-month	dummies.	This	is	to	relax	the	specification	found	in	
1	 because	 calendar-month	 dummies	 could	 potentially	 be	 capturing	 all	 variation	 in	 fire	










































columns,	 the	data	are	 for	 the	years	2003	 to	2012.	All	 regressions	 include	a	 third	degree	polynomial	 function	of	






















instead	of	using	only	 the	half	of	 the	buffer	 to	which	 the	wind	 is	 coming	 from	 relative	 to	 the	





















Although	 the	 results	 are	not	 as	 strong	as	when	 considering	 infant	mortality	 and	 stillbirths	 as	





sugarcane	 burning	 from	2000	 to	 2007	 is	 considered	 as	 the	main	 predictor.	 The	 findings	 also	
corroborate	those	found	in	Uriarte	et	al.	(2009),	who	also	use	fire	occurrences	as	an	indicator	of	
sugarcane	burning	and	distinct	effects	for	different	age	groups.	
























numbers	 when	 total	 external	 costs	 are	 considered.	 Note	 also	 that	 these	 are	 the	 savings	 in	














to	 states	 other	 than	 São	 Paulo,	 where	 sugarcane	 burning	 is	 also	 an	 important	 source	 of	 air	
















Intergovernmental	 transfers	play	an	 important	 role	 in	ensuring	provision	of	public	goods	and	
services	 are	 decentralized,	 especially	 in	 settings	where	 local	 governments	 do	 not	 have	 fiscal	
capacity.31	However,	allocations	of	intergovernmental	transfers	are	frequently	subject	to	political	
motivation	 rather	 than	 based	 on	 social	 values	 (Brollo	 &	 Nannicini,	 2012;	 Firpo,	 Ponczek	 &	
Sanfelice,	 2015).	 In	 order	 to	 reward	 core	 supporters	 and/or	 expand	 their	 base,	 politicians	
frequently	 influence	 the	 allocation	 of	 intergovernmental	 transfers.	 Although	previous	 studies	
have	shown	that	“pork-barrel”	politics	pay	off	in	subsequent	elections	(Evans,	2004;	Stratmann,	
2013;	 Firpo	et	al.,	 2015),32	 it	 is	not	 clear	whether	 voters	are	 indeed	better	off	when	electing	
representatives	 in	 situations	 where	 such	 mechanisms	 exist.	 This	 paper	 is	 interested	 in	 the	
linkages	between	the	output	of	local	governments	and	political	representation	at	the	national	









33	 Members	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Chamber	 of	 Deputies	 are	 known	 as	 federal	 deputies	 –	 which	 are	 comparable	 to	
Representatives	in	the	US.	
	 38	
Variation	of	political	 representation	 in	the	Brazilian	Chamber	of	Deputies	 is	exogenous	to	the	
municipality.	Seats	are	assigned	to	electoral	districts	that	conform	to	very	large	state	boundaries,	
which	makes	campaigning	in	all	parts	of	the	district	very	expensive	(Ames,	1995).	Hence,	many	
candidates	 strategically	 concentrate	 their	 efforts	 on	 municipalities	 or	 neighbourhoods	 that	
constitute	 their	de	 facto	 constituencies	 –	 areas	within	 the	 deputies’	 electoral	 districts.34	 This	
alone	allows	the	number	of	deputies	elected	associated	to	each	municipality	within	the	state	to	










number	 of	 outcomes	 on	 the	 constructed	 municipal	 political	 representation	 measure.	 The	










employing	 fixed	 effects	 models,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 capture	 the	 effect	 of	 variation	 in	 political	




goods	 and	 services.	 According	 to	 the	 fixed	 effects	model,	 one	 additional	 “associate”	 deputy	
decreases	the	share	of	low	birthweights	among	live	births	by	0.06%-points,	while	the	share	of	
schools	with	a	sports	court	 increases	by	0.5%-points.	These	 findings	are	also	observed	across	
other	 school	 and	 infant	 health	 outcomes.	 Furthermore,	 political	 representation	 from	
“government-aligned”	associate	deputies,	provide	larger	impacts	on	public	goods	and	services.	





















transfers.	 Previous	 studies	 looking	 at	 intergovernmental	 transfers	 in	 various	 countries	 have	







politically	 motivated.	 In	 Sweden,	 Dahlberg	 &	 Johansson	 (2002)	 found	 evidence	 of	 political	
influence	in	the	expansion	of	federal	transfers	to	local	governments	to	support	environmental	
sustainability	programs	a	few	months	before	the	1998	elections.	 In	Albania,	Case	(2001)	finds	
that	 federal	 transfers	were	not	only	an	 important	 instrument	of	social	assistance	to	the	most	
vulnerable	people	 in	the	country,	but	also	an	instrument	to	gain	political	support.	 In	the	U.S.,	
Ansolabehere,	Gerber	&	Snyder	 (2002)	 show	that	prior	 to	court-ordered	redistricting	of	 state	
	 41	
legislative	districts	 in	 the	 1960s,	 state	 transfers	 to	 counties	were	disproportionately	 larger	 in	
counties	with	relatively	more	legislative	seats	per	person	than	the	state	average.	




















Besides	 this	 introduction	 and	 the	 concluding	 remarks	 in	 the	 last	 section,	 this	 paper	 has	 the	
following	 structure.	 Section	 II	 lays	 out	 a	 general	 description	 of	 the	 institutional	 background	
regarding	intergovernmental	transfers	in	Brazil	and	local	provision	of	public	goods	and	services.	






and	services.	 In	Brazil,	on	average,	only	5%	of	 total	 receipts	 come	 from	 local	 taxes.	For	most	
municipalities,	federal	funds	represent	the	largest	portion	of	all	receipts.	There	are	basically	two	
types	 of	 federal	 transfers:	 constitutional	 automatic	 transfers,	 which	 the	 policymaker	 cannot	
decide	on	how	to	allocate,	and	voluntary	(discretionary)	transfers,	whose	destination	deputies	
may	partly	determine,	via	 legislation.	Although	the	largest	portion	of	transfers	are	mandatory	
and	 formula-based,	 a	 fair	 share	 of	 all	 federal	 transfers	 is	 discretionary.	 In	 at	 least	 two	ways	
Congress	 has	 direct	 influence	 over	 the	 discretionary	 funds.	 First,	 the	 annual	 budget	 with	 all	
spending	 needs	 to	 be	 approved	 by	 Congress	 before	 execution.	 Second,	 Congress	 has	 the	
prerogative	to	authorize	reallocation	of	government	budget	through	amendments	to	the	federal	








budgetary	 committee,	 which	 also	 approves	 individual	 amendments.	 A	 maximum	 amount	 of	
money	and	 individual	 requests	 is	set	 for	each	member	of	Congress.	The	number	of	 individual	
amendments	and	their	maximum	value	have	varied	across	the	years.	Today	each	member	can	
claim	up	to	25	amendments,	and	for	the	2018	annual	budget	the	combined	value	should	not	be	




Brazilian	deputy	 receives	 in	a	municipality	and	 the	number	of	 individual	budget	amendments	
authorized	by	the	deputy	to	the	municipality.	Although	one	would	expect	that	legislators	should	
















this	 process,	 many	 municipalities	 were	 created.	 While	 in	 the	 1980s	 there	 were	 3,974	
municipalities	in	the	country,	today	this	number	has	increased	to	a	total	of	5,570	autonomous	
municipalities.	
Besides	 providing	 public	 transport,	 local	 governments’	 main	 responsibilities	 also	 involve	
managing	 public	 elementary	 schools	 and	 basic	 health	 clinics.	 Although	 there	 have	 been	
improvements	 in	 the	output	of	public	goods	and	services,	great	differences	are	still	observed	
across	municipalities.	For	instance,	in	the	term	2007–2010,	while	only	7%	of	the	municipalities	






















Only	 the	 candidates	with	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 individual	 votes	within	 the	 coalition	will	 be	
granted	with	seats.	Because	the	seats	are	first	allocated	to	the	coalitions,	votes	cast	to	individual	
















44	The	electoral	quotient	 is	equal	 to	 the	total	of	valid	votes	 in	 the	district	divided	by	 the	number	of	seats	 in	 the	
district.	
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associate	 of	 municipality	𝑚	 if,	 taking	 the	 number	 of	 votes	 received	 in	 municipality	𝑚,	 the	
candidate	is	ranked	among	the	municipality’s	effective	number	of	candidates.	Put	differently,	a	
candidate	𝑖	is	municipality	𝑚’s	“associate”	candidate	for	the	term	𝑡	if	
𝐴);* = 1 𝑟);* ≤ 𝐸;* = 1,	
where	𝐸;*	is	the	number	of	effective	candidates	a	municipality	𝑚	had	in	term	𝑡	and	𝑟);*	is	the	






) 	 is	used	 to	estimate	 the	number	of	effective	candidates	 in	a	
municipality	 in	 each	 term,	 where	 𝑠);*	 and	 𝑠0;*	 are	 the	 share	 of	 votes	 candidate	 𝑖	 and	 the	
candidate	 with	 most	 votes	 receive	 in	 municipality	 𝑚	 respectively.45	 Finally,	 local	 political	
representation	in	the	lower	chamber	is	measured	as	






45	 In	 the	 appendix,	 as	 sensitivity	 tests	 results	 for	 an	 alternative	 index	 of	 effective	 number	 of	 candidates	 are	
presented.	




This	section	describes	 in	detail	 the	 identification	of	variation	 in	political	representation	within	



















47	 Differently,	 from	 the	 U.S.,	 many	 federal	 deputies	 aspire	 to	 be	 mayors.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 current	 2016	
municipality	elections,	close	to	20%	of	federal	deputies	are	candidates.	
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that	 candidates	 represent	de	 facto	 districts	 across	different	parts	of	 the	 state,	 this	 generates	








the	 number	 of	 associate	 deputies	 across	 municipalities	 in	 the	 state	 of	 São	 Paulo.	 Panel	 (A)	
highlights	the	change	from	1998	to	2002	and	Panel	(B)	the	change	from	2002	to	2006.	The	state	
of	São	Paulo	is	the	largest	district	in	terms	of	magnitude	–	70	seats	are	assigned	to	São	Paulo	–	
and	 the	 second	 largest	 in	 terms	 of	 municipalities	 (645).	 The	 figure	 clearly	 shows	 that	
























The	 fixed	 effects	models	will	 reduce	 possible	 biases	 from	 time-invariant	municipality	 specific	
unobserved	factors	such	as	voters’	level	of	political	engagement	and	or	ideology.	If	a	municipality	
has	 a	 large	 share	of	 strategic	 voters	 such	 that	 it	 enhances	 its	 likelihood	of	 electing	 associate	
candidates,	then	voters	are	also	likely	to	hold	politicians	for	better	provision	of	public	goods	and	
services.	Another	source	of	bias	could	stem	from	voters	with	national	interest	(ideology).	Voters	
with	strong	national	 interests	vote	on	candidates	that	are	 less	 likely	to	put	 local	 interest	first.	
Therefore,	 not	 controlling	 for	 voters’	 level	 of	 political	 engagement	 (or	 ideology)	 could	 be	





The	 variable	 of	 interest,	 number	 of	 “associate”	 candidates	 elected,	 is	 constructed	 using	 the	
number	of	votes	obtained	by	deputies	in	the	1998,	2002	and	2006	elections.	All	vote	data	were	
collected	 from	 the	 Superior	 Electoral	 Court	 (Tribunal	 Superior	 Eleitoral,	 TSE).51	 In	 order	 to	
calculate	 the	 number	 of	 “associate”	 candidates	 elected,	 the	 number	 of	 votes	 received	 by	
																																																						
49	Time-varying	covariates	include:	number	of	effective	candidates,	log	of	population,	log	of	GDP	per	capita	(in	2012	
reais),	 share	 of	 turnout,	 and	 a	 dummy	 if	 the	mayor	 is	 the	 same	 throughout	 the	 term.	When	 regressing	 school	




51	 The	 English	 version	 of	 the	 Superior	 Electoral	 Court	 website	 can	 be	 accessed	 in	 the	 following	 link:	
http://english.tse.jus.br/.	
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Number	of	associate	candidates 4.91 4.65 2.55 3.88 0 63 14,995
Number	of	associate	candidates	elected 3.36 2.97 2.46 1.66 0 39 14,995





Table	 2.2	 provides	 summary	 statistics	 of	 municipal	 public	 accounts.	 On	 average,	 across	
municipalities	 and	 terms,	 the	 yearly	 per	 capita	 value	 of	 approved	 discretionary	 transfers	 is	
R$81.56	 (less	 than	 30	 dollars	 today),	 which	 in	 a	 term	 amounts	 to	 approximately	 R$320	
(approximately	100	dollars).	By	contrast,	the	yearly	average	of	automatic	transfers	is	R$671.21	
(roughly	215	dollars).	In	addition	to	intergovernmental	transfers,	it	is	also	interesting	to	see	the	




































Variable Mean SD Obs
Annual	discretionary	transfers,	in	R$	per	capita 81.56 104.47 13,684
Annual	automatic	transfers,	in	R$	per	capita 671.21 492.29 13,684
Annual	total	revenues,	in	R$	per	capita 1,760.15 1,333.60 13,684
Annual	total	spending,	in	R$	per	capita 1,444.70 890.69 13,684
Annual	spending	in	health,	in	R$	per	capita 361.81 218.60 13,684
Annual	spending	in	education,	in	R$	per	capita 495.90 286.78 13,684
Variable Mean SD Obs
Share	of	low	birth	weights,	% 7.3 2.1 14,895
Share	of	7+	pre-natal	consultations,	% 49.8 23.5 14,895
Share	of	low	birth	weights	(low-educ),	% 7.6 3 14,895
Share	of	7+	pre-natal	consultations	(low-educ),	% 44.1 23.5 14,895
Share	of	low	birth	weights	(high-educ),	% 6.7 2.9 14,895




















capita	values.	Although	OLS	estimates	do	not	 indicate	 that	 there	 is	any	 relationship	between	
0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100%
Share	of	schools	with	a	library,	% 25.2 29.3 14,130 18.5% 3.1% 14.8% 3.7% 10.8% 7.1%
Share	of	schools	with	a	sports	court,	% 21.9 28.7 14,130 32.4% 2.4% 24.4% 4.0% 22.8% 6.1%
Share	of	schools	with	computers,	% 34.7 36.6 14,130 35.3% 4.4% 15.9% 12.0% 1.5% 20.8%
Share	of	schools	with	internet,	% 16.3 24.6 14,130 83.7% 0.0% 20.8% 0.1% 8.4% 7.7%
Share	of	schools	with	printer,	% 32.1 35.6 14,130 37.6% 3.3% 18.7% 8.5% 2.7% 18.2%
Share	of	schools	with	projectors,	% 21.3 29.2 14,130 39.2% 2.0% 25.8% 4.8% 15.3% 7.7%
Variable 2007	-	20102003	-	20061999	-	2002





show	 that	 once	 all	 municipal	 time	 invariant	 factors	 are	 accounted	 for	 there	 is	 a	 positive	
correlation	between	representation	in	the	chamber	of	deputies	and	discretionary	transfers.	By	
















OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
-0.739 2.583*** -0.029** -0.056*** 0.429** 0.210
(0.659) (0.698) (0.014) (0.013) (0.201) (0.151)
10.56*** 1.871 0.871*** 0.475*** 0.573*** 0.524***
(2.026) (1.293) (0.143) (0.088) (0.208) (0.138)
26.34*** 11.91** -0.058*** -0.079*** 0.853*** 0.577***
(7.857) (5.866) (0.020) (0.022) (0.209) (0.161)
14.80*** 4.943 0.840*** 0.443*** 0.685*** 0.804***
(5.526) (3.295) (0.145) (0.098) (0.157) (0.166)
3.311** 3.362*** -0.023 -0.058*** 0.856*** 0.570***
(1.517) (0.984) (0.018) (0.021) (0.208) (0.156)
4.306** 1.583 0.730*** 0.416*** 0.696*** 0.462***
(2.122) (1.283) (0.137) (0.087) (0.211) (0.145)
Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes
Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes
Obs. 13,673 13,673 Obs. 14,887 14,887 Obs. 14,123 14,123
A.    Impacts	on	intergovernmental
transfers,	total	revenues	and	spendings












































and	education,	 there	 is	 a	positive	 impact	on	health	expenditure,	but	no	effect	on	education.	
Lastly,	once	controlling	for	municipal	fixed	effects	and	other	covariates,	there	is	no	relationship	










column	of	 Panel	B,	OLS	estimates	 are	 shown	 in	 the	 first	 column	 for	 the	 sake	of	 comparison.	
Although	most	OLS	estimates	are	significant,	the	point	estimates	are	slightly	different	from	the	
fixed	effects	estimates.	









schools.	The	 results	 indicate	 that	well	 represented	municipalities	 in	 the	Chamber	of	Deputies	
have	better	output	of	public	schools	in	terms	of	infrastructure	and	technology.	All	outcomes	with	




These	 findings	 suggest	 that	political	 representation	 increases	 the	output	of	 public	 goods	 and	
services	in	municipalities.	Furthermore,	the	results	suggest	a	potential	mechanism	to	explain	how	
political	 representation	through	additional	 financial	 resources	obtained	via	 intergovernmental	
transfers	to	local	administrations	improves	the	quality	of	public	goods	and	services.	
Next,	a	series	of	results	that	extend	and	validate	the	main	findings	are	presented.	First,	we	test	














𝑦;* = 𝛼 +	𝛽0𝑋;*
def +	𝛽C𝑋;* +	𝛽D𝑍;* +	𝜇* +	𝜇; + 𝜖;*	
where	𝑋;*
def	is	the	number	of	government-aligned	deputies.	
The	 results	 are	 presented	 in	 Table	 2.6.	 The	 findings	 indicate	 that	 being	 represented	 by	
government	 aligned	 deputies	 is	 more	 impactful	 than	 being	 represented	 by	 the	 opposition.	
Indeed,	 the	 difference	 between	 an	 additional	 government-aligned	 deputy	 and	 an	 additional	
opposition-aligned	deputy	is	positive	with	regards	to	discretionary	transfers,	which	indicates	that	
representation	from	government-aligned	deputies	translates	into	more	discretionary	funds.	The	
estimated	extra	 effect	 of	 government-aligned	deputies	 is	 also	 significant	 on	most	 health	 and	
school	 quality	 outcomes.	 For	 example,	 representation	 in	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Deputies	 of	 one	



















of	 just	 under	 300	 thousand	 in	 the	 2006	 elections,	 the	 state	 of	 Rondônia	 had	 a	 ratio	 of	 91	
















Term	dummies Yes Term	dummies Yes Term	dummies Yes
Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes







































A.    Impacts	on	intergovernmental
transfers,	total	revenues	and	spendings























median	 number	 of	 valid	 votes	 per	 seat,	 the	 marginal	 effect	 of	 political	 representation,	 on	
Below Above Below Above Below Above
-0.098 3.209*** -0.021 -0.066*** 0.404** -0.006
(1.624) (0.706) (0.021) (0.016) (0.167) (0.206)
-1.333 -0.201 0.281* 0.341*** 0.407*** 0.300
(2.209) (1.262) (0.163) (0.105) (0.144) (0.190)
11.929 4.961 0.002 -0.108*** 0.323 0.326
(9.977) (5.604) (0.029) (0.030) (0.250) (0.202)
0.931 3.105 0.307* 0.275** 0.377* 0.574***
(5.582) (2.708) (0.172) (0.120) (0.226) (0.211)
2.339 2.361** -0.063* -0.054** 0.357 0.318
(1.812) (0.972) (0.037) (0.027) (0.238) (0.196)
-0.333 2.892*** 0.316* 0.257** -0.018 0.417**
(2.198) (1.075) (0.172) (0.100) (0.184) (0.196)
Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes
Municipal	FE Yes Yes Municipal	FE Yes Yes Municipal	FE Yes Yes
Obs. 6,137 7,536 Obs. 7,047 7,840 Obs. 6,951 7,172
A.    Impacts	on	intergovernmental
transfers,	total	revenues	and	spendings










































average,	 decreases	 the	 share	 of	 low	 birth	 weights	 among	 low	 educated	 mothers	 by	 0.1	
percentage	points.	Whereas	 in	municipalities	with	a	below	median	number	of	valid	votes	per	
seat,	 there	 is	 no	 effect.	 Throughout	 most	 outcomes	 the	 effects	 appear	 to	 be	 stronger	 in	















Discrepancies	 in	 the	 ratios	 municipalities	 to	 seats	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 another	 form	 of	
malapportionment.	The	number	of	municipalities	per	state	in	Brazil	varies	from	15	in	Roraima	to	
Below Above Below Above Below Above
1.397 3.696*** -0.020 -0.089*** 0.101 0.034
(1.068) (0.894) (0.016) (0.021) (0.212) (0.198)
0.718 1.896 0.500*** 0.349*** 0.377** 0.514**
(2.005) (1.893) (0.120) (0.126) (0.165) (0.210)
-2.014 24.78*** -0.011 -0.137*** 0.332* 0.556**
(8.625) (7.041) (0.024) (0.037) (0.193) (0.245)
2.241 6.459** 0.469*** 0.337** 0.027 1.247***
(7.487) (2.991) (0.133) (0.144) (0.221) (0.239)
3.974** 2.156** -0.025 -0.093** 0.366* 0.538**
(2.006) (1.060) (0.023) (0.037) (0.187) (0.238)
1.219 2.883** 0.528*** 0.221* 0.437** 0.389*
(2.825) (1.164) (0.120) (0.126) (0.204) (0.202)
Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes
Municipal	FE Yes Yes Municipal	FE Yes Yes Municipal	FE Yes Yes
Obs. 5,718 7,955 Obs. 6,468 8,419 Obs. 6,030 8,093
A.    Impacts	on	intergovernmental
transfers,	total	revenues	and	spendings


























































Chamber	 of	 Deputies	 is	 constructed	 by	 only	 considering	 candidates	 that	 are	 associated	 to	
municipalities	but	were	not	elected	and	had	the	highest	votes	among	losing	candidates.	Table	
2.7	provides	the	results	for	this	 falsification	test.	The	fixed	effect	estimates	 in	 its	majority	are	


















influences	 the	 quantity	 and	 quality	 of	 locally	 provided	 goods	 and	 services	 in	 health	 and	
education.	Because	of	Brazil’s	political	and	electoral	systems,	it	is	possible	to	identify	variation	in	
political	representation	in	the	chamber	of	deputies	within	municipalities.	The	results	indicate	that	
municipalities	 with	 more	 associated	 deputies	 in	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Deputies	 present	 better	
indicators	in	health	and	education.	This	is	likely	because	of	deputies	bringing	home	the	bacon.	
Having	more	associated	deputies	is	also	associated	with	more	discretionary	intergovernmental	
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
-0.965*** 0.242 0.045*** -0.002 0.253*** -0.018
-(0.138) -(0.160) (0.004) (0.003) (0.048) (0.035)
0.386 -0.650** 0.327*** 0.015 0.240*** -0.013
(0.441) (0.277) (0.032) (0.022) (0.051) (0.030)
1.508 -2.369** 0.048*** -0.004 0.229*** 0.004
(1.698) (1.034) (0.005) (0.005) (0.054) (0.037)
1.728 -1.695* 0.297*** 0.019 0.190*** 0.063
(1.229) (0.960) (0.034) (0.025) (0.038) (0.039)
0.727** -0.369 0.041*** 0.001 0.234*** 0.010
(0.347) (0.282) (0.004) (0.005) (0.054) (0.036)
-0.204 -0.704** 0.283*** 0.027 0.116** -0.011
(0.457) (0.342) (0.031) (0.022) (0.051) (0.031)
Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes
Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes
Obs. 13,673 13,673 Obs. 14,887 14,887 Obs. 14,123 14,123
A.    Impacts	on	intergovernmental
transfers,	total	revenues	and	spendings










































transfers.	 This	 analysis	 adds	 to	 the	 current	 literature	 on	 redistributive	 politics	 in	 Brazil	 and	











enforcement	 mechanism	 to	 keep	 the	 policy	 choices	 of	 politicians	 in	 line	 with	 voters’	 policy	
preferences	(Barro,	1973;	and	Ferejohn,	1986).	That	is,	in	the	absence	of	re-election	incentives,	
incumbents	 are	 susceptible	 to	 shirking	 or	 engaging	 in	 opportunistic	 behavior.	 A	 number	 of	
studies	have	empirically	tested	whether	term	limits	impact	politicians’	policy	choices.	Besley	and	
Case	 (1995	and	2003)	 looked	at	 the	effects	of	 term	 limits	on	 fiscal	policies	 such	as	 taxes	and	
spending.	Following	Besley	and	Case	(1995),	others	have	looked	at	the	effects	of	term	limits	on	
different	dimensions,	such	as	economic	performance	(Alt,	Bueno	de	Mesquita,	&	Rose,	2011),	





on	 policy	 choices	 that	 are	 either	 not	 tangible	 to	 voters	 or	 in	 which	 voters	 are	 not	 able	 to	
distinguish	who	is	responsible	for	them.	As	heads	of	local	governments	in	Brazil,	mayors	play	an	
important	 and	 direct	 role	 in	 executing	 and	maintaining	 programs	 in	 primary	 healthcare	 and	





























of	 close	mayoral	 elections	 analysed	 is	 different.	 In	Klašnja	 and	Titiunik	 (2017)	 the	 incumbent	
sample	is	restricted	to	incumbents	running	for	re-election	who	have	not	changed	party.	This	is	
because	their	main	objective	is	to	test	party	incumbency	effect	in	a	context	of	weak	parties	and	

























regression	 discontinuity	 design,	 one	 should	 be	 cautious	 about	 making	 generalizations.	
Nevertheless,	Brazil’s	mayoral	elections	provide	a	fair	number	of	close	elections,	which	is	likely	
to	mitigate	external	validity	concerns.	
In	 addition	 to	 this	 introduction,	 this	 paper	 discusses	 the	 relevant	 institutional	 background	 in	
section	II.	Section	III	and	IV	describe	the	empirical	strategy	and	data	used.	In	section	V,	the	main	







are	 absent,	 a	 weak	 party	 system	 reinforces	 the	 reverse	 incentives	 produced	 by	 lack	 of	
accountability	to	voters	on	the	political	agents.	In	this	situation,	politicians	are	more	likely	to	shirk	







Their	 theory	 has	 three	 empirical	 implications.	 First,	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 party	 incumbency	





close	 municipal	 elections	 where	 an	 incumbent	 party	 barely	 wins	 or	 loses.	 Under	 certain	
assumptions,	this	design	identifies	the	effects	of	term	limits	on	different	outcomes.	The	authors	





executive	 offices	 such	 as	 mayors,	 governors	 and	 president.	 An	 amendment	 to	 the	 1988	
Constitution	in	1997	enabled	all	elected	officials	to	run	for	a	second	consecutive	term.	There	are	
no	restrictions	on	non-consecutive	re-elections,	however.	There	have	been	5	mayoral	elections	
since	 1997	 (2000,	 2004,	 2008,	 2012,	 and	 2016	 elections).	 This	 study	 examines	 all	 mayoral	
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elections	 from	 2000	 to	 2012.	 In	municipalities	 with	 an	 electorate	 smaller	 than	 200,000,	 the	




occurred	 from	2000	to	2012.60	The	 incumbent	 ran	 for	 re-election	 in	approximately	50%	of	all	

























2000 5,524 19 5,543 65.1 37.9 21.0 4.9 12.1 11.2 22.6 18.5 17.8 3.3 24
2004 5,516 43 5,559 38.4 22.0 13.3 3.6 8.6 9.9 19.1 14.2 15.7 7.4 24
2008 5,526 30 5,556 53.7 36.6 14.2 3.9 10.6 9.9 21.6 8.9 14.2 10.0 23
2012 5,517 50 5,567 41.6 23.3 15.0 3.6 9.0 8.6 18.3 5.0 12.5 11.5 26

















and	services.	This	 is	especially	 the	case	 in	 local	health	and	education	goods	and	services.	The	
process	of	devolution	triggered	by	Brazil’s	1988	Constitution	gave	municipalities	autonomy	and	
established	the	role	each	federal	entity	plays	in	the	provision	of	public	goods	and	services.61	In	
addition	 to	 providing	 local	 services	 such	 as	 public	 transportation	 and	 infrastructure,	 the	
Constitution	 provides	 that	 municipalities	 are	 responsible	 for	 maintaining	 primary	 school	
programs	 and	providing	 primary	 healthcare	 services.	 Although	member	 states	 and	 the	union	
have	 to	 provide	 technical	 and	 financial	 assistance,	 each	 municipality	 is	 administered	











62	 According	 to	 CNES/DATASUS,	 as	 of	December	 2016,	 there	were	 70,000	health	 establishments	 including	 basic	





Most	 primary	 public	 schools	 are	 administered	 by	 local	 governments.	 There	 are	 over	 114	
thousand	municipal	 schools,	most	 of	which	 are	 primary	 schools.	 The	 share	 of	 public	 primary	
schools	run	by	local	governments	is	around	78%.	Similar	to	public	health	services,	there	is	high	
dissatisfaction	with	the	current	provision	of	education	services	(IPEA,	2011).	Approximately	half	
of	 municipal	 school	 students	 in	 their	 5th	 grade	 (5º	 Ano)	 are	 considered	 to	 have	 adequate	




If	 only	 simple	 comparisons	were	 to	be	made	between	municipalities	 that	 had	 term-bounded	
mayors	and	those	that	did	not,	using	OLS	regressions	for	 instance,	the	estimated	effect	of	re-
election	 on	 public	 goods	 could	 be	 threatened	 by	 selection	 bias.	 Mayors	 with	 considerable	
political	abilities	are	more	likely	to	be	re-elected	(become	term-bounded)	and	offer	more	public	
goods	and	services.	Therefore,	municipalities	with	re-elected	mayors	have	a	larger	proportion	of	
high-skilled	mayors,	which	 could	 underestimate	 the	 effect	 of	 term	 limits	 on	 the	 provision	 of	
public	goods	and	services.	Moreover,	other	confounding	variables	not	necessarily	observed,	such	








close	 elections	 are	 not	 manipulated,	 re-election	 (treatment)	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 randomized	







Following	 Klašnja	 and	 Titiunik	 (2017),	 the	 treatment	 effect	 is	 estimated	 by	 the	 difference	
between	local	linear	regressions	on	both	sides	of	the	electoral	tie.	Let	𝑚𝑣;	be	the	assignment	












term	 converges	 to	 the	 expected	 outcome	 of	 municipalities	 with	 first-term	 mayors	 at	 the	











observables	 related	 to	 individual	 candidates’	 characteristics	 and	 municipal	 socio-economic	
characteristics,	 including	 the	 lagged	 outcomes,	 are	 tested	 for	 discontinuities	 around	 the	
threshold.	If	the	test	rejects	the	continuity	assumption	for	the	observed	data,	this	indicates	that	
the	continuity	assumption	has	been	violated.	Table	3.2	provides	the	results	for	a	number	of	pre-
treatment	 outcomes,	 including	 the	 outcomes	 of	 interest.	 The	 results	 show	 that	 there	 is	 no	
evidence	of	discontinuities	in	the	covariates	considered.	P-values	adjusted	for	multiple	testing	















as	 in	 Calonico,	 Cattaneo	 and	 Titiunik	 (2014).	 For	 each	 sample	 considered,	 the	 columns	 report,	 respectively,	







Estimate p -value BW N	(treat) N	(control)
GDP	per	capita,	in	logs -0.064 [ -0.1863 ; 0.0447 ] 0.23 12.06 2,663 2,231
Population,	in	logs -0.032 [ -0.1619 ; 0.1148 ] 0.74 11.88 2,637 2,217
Region,	North	or	Northeast=1 0.057 [ -0.0004 ; 0.1313 ] 0.05 12.34 2,715 2,268
Effective	number	of	parties -0.045 [ -0.1089 ; 0.0091 ] 0.10 15.88 3,301 2,635
Gender,	male=1 0.008 [ -0.0244 ; 0.0376 ] 0.68 20.08 3,907 2,950
Education,	higher	education=1 -0.017 [ -0.0752 ; 0.0438 ] 0.61 16.71 3,422 2,716
%	of	live	births	with	weight	less	than	2.5Kg,	t 0.000 [ -0.0035 ; 0.0040 ] 0.89 13.48 2,307 1,798
%	of	live	births	with	7	or	more	antenatal	consult.,	t -0.007 [ -0.0393 ; 0.0321 ] 0.84 12.18 2,127 1,697
%	of	schools	with	libraries,	t -0.003 [ -0.0326 ; 0.0305 ] 0.95 12.80 2,216 1,727
%	of	schools	with	labs,	t -0.003 [ -0.0226 ; 0.0159 ] 0.73 14.57 2,443 1,890
%	of	schools	with	sports	courts,	t -0.014 [ -0.0448 ; 0.0143 ] 0.31 13.50 2,300 1,788









incumbents	 running	 for	 re-election	 in	2000.	The	candidates’	 full	names	were	used	 to	 identify	
incumbents	when	individual	national	identification	numbers	(CPF)	were	not	available	(elections	
1996,	2000	and	2004).66	The	sample	used	in	the	analysis	only	includes	mayoral	elections	in	2000,	








sample	 of	mayoral	 elections	 considered	 in	 this	 paper	 has	 over	 1,500	more	 elections	 than	 in	
Klašnja	and	Titiunik’s	incumbency	sample.	However,	only	70%	of	the	elections	considered	here	
																																																						
























discrepancies	 of	 around	 250	 elections	 is	 either	 because	 the	municipality	 was	 newly	 formed	 or	 not	 possible	 to	
determine	whether	the	incumbent	ran	or	not.	












9,763 6,488 372 6,860 211 2,661 31 2,903
100% 66.5% 3.8% 70.3% 2.2% 27.3% 0.3% 29.7%
8,135 6,488 372 6,860 42 3 1,230 1,275










(DATASUS).69	Two	 indicators	were	considered:	 share	of	 live	births	considered	 low	weight	and	
share	of	pregnant	mothers	with	more	than	7	antenatal	consultations.	Following	the	World	Health	
Organization,	low	birthweight	is	defined	as	a	weight	less	than	2,500	grams	(5.5	lb).	
Annual	 school	 censuses	 conducted	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 provide	 information	 on	
infrastructure	and	technology	from	every	school.70	The	municipal	outcomes	considered	are	share	
of	municipal	primary	schools	with	sports	courts,	libraries,	and	IT	or	science	labs.	The	health	and	





the	 empirical	 implication	 of	 Klašnja	 and	 Titiunik’s	 (2017)	 theoretical	 framework,	 this	 section	























The	 other	 two	 panels	 of	 Table	 3.4	 present	 treatment	 effects	 of	 term	 limits	 on	 health	 and	
education	 expenditures	 separately.	 All	 estimates,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 sample	 considered,	 are	
statistically	insignificant	at	standard	levels.	Thus,	when	looking	at	expenditures	for	education	and	













estimates	 of	 the	 effect	 on	 public	 goods	 expenditure	 using	 tighter	 and	 commonly	 used	




Estimate 95%	CI p -value BW N	(treat) N	(control)
Dependent	variable:	%	of	health,	education	and	social	assistance	expenditure
Full	sample -0.64 [-1.91;		0.81] 0.43 10.7 1,931 1,591
KT's	sample -1.24 [-2.51;	-0.10] 0.03 18.3 2,177 1,758
Sample	not	matched 2.02 [-0.14;		4.95] 0.06 10.9 502 385
Dependent	variable:	%	of	health	expenditure
Full	sample -0.26 [-1.29;		0.79] 0.64 19.1 1,992 1,548
KT's	sample -0.57 [-1.82;		0.50] 0.27 11.3 1,778 1,443
Sample	not	matched -0.46 [-2.65;		1.71] 0.67 14.7 557 427
Dependent	variable:	%	of	education	expenditure
Full	sample -0.19 [-1.97;		1.34] 0.71 16.7 1,933 1,559
KT's	sample -1.06 [-3.27;		0.92] 0.27 10.0 1,708 1,417





Note:	Running	variable	 is	 incumbent’s	margin	of	victory	at	t,	 the	outcome	is	the	share	of	expenditure	on	health,	
education	and	social	assistance.	Estimate	is	average	treatment	effect	at	cutoff	estimated	with	local	linear	regression	
















Full	sample Estimate -1.80 -0.67477 -0.89
p-value (0.479) (0.440) (0.446)
[Nt	,		Nc] [170;	183] [314;	375] [491;	574]
KT's	sample Estimate -3.00 -2.4549 -1.95
p-value (0.448) (0.234) (0.078)
[Nt	,		Nc] [128;	128] [240;	270] [389;	415]
Sample	not	matched Estimate -1.32 -1.9158 -1.634
p-value (0.839) (0.514) (0.136)




Note:	 Running	 variable	 is	 incumbent’s	margin	 of	 victory	 at	 t,	 two	 outcomes	 on	 primary	 healthcare	 services	 are	
considered	and	are	indicated	in	each	panel.	Estimate	is	average	treatment	effect	at	cutoff	estimated	with	local	linear	
regression	with	triangular	kernel	and	MSE-optimal	bandwidth,	as	in	Calonico,	Cattaneo	and	Titiunik	(2014).	For	each	
sample	considered,	 the	columns	report,	 respectively,	 treatment	effect	estimate,	95%	robust	confidence	 interval,	
robust	p-value,	main	optimal	bandwidth,	treated	observations	within	bandwidth,	and	control	observations	within	
bandwidth.	
Table	 3.7	 presents	 the	 RD-estimated	 effects	 of	 term	 limits	 on	 school	 infrastructure.	 Three	
measures	are	considered:	share	of	schools	with	libraries,	share	of	schools	with	science	labs	and	




to	 believe	 that	 re-elected	 mayors	 perform	 differently	 from	 first-term	 mayors	 after	 a	 close	
election.	
3.6.	Alternative	explanations	
The	 evidence	 presented	 in	 this	 paper	 fails	 to	 support	 accountability	 models	 on	 term	 limits.	
Besides	the	absence	of	re-election	incentives,	other	incentives	such	as	in-party	accountability	or	
long-term	 political	 careers	 may	 also	 impact	 policy	 choices	 and	 outcomes	 of	 term-bounded	
Estimate 95%	CI p -value BW N	(treat) N	(control)
Dependent	variable:	%	of	live	births	with	weight	less	than	2.5kg
Full	sample 0.00 [-0.47;	0.43] 0.92 19.9 2,298 1,820
KT's	sample -0.22 [-0.67;		0.18] 0.26 14.4 2,487 1,944
Sample	not	matched -0.42 [-1.19;		0.43] 0.36 13.9 631 476
Dependent	variable:	%	of	live	births	with	7	or	more	antenatal	consultations
Full	sample -0.63 [-4.25;		2.20] 0.53 21.2 2,386 1,866
KT's	sample -0.76 [-4.28;		2.73] 0.66 13.4 2,346 1,840
Sample	not	matched -0.63 [-6.36;		5.88] 0.94 14.4 645 483
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Note:	 Running	 variable	 is	 incumbent’s	margin	 of	 victory	 at	 t,	 two	 outcomes	 on	 primary	 healthcare	 services	 are	
considered	and	are	indicated	in	each	panel.	Estimate	is	average	treatment	effect	at	cutoff	estimated	with	local	linear	
regression	with	triangular	kernel	and	MSE-optimal	bandwidth,	as	in	Calonico,	Cattaneo	and	Titiunik	(2014).	For	each	




limits	because	only	a	 small	number	of	 re-elected	mayors	 run	 for	other	offices	and/or	are	 re-
elected	 for	 a	 non-consecutive	 third-term.	 In	 the	 sample	 of	 elections	 examined	 in	 this	 study,	
however,	re-elected	mayors	are	considerably	likely	to	run	again	for	mayor	in	the	future	or	for	
another	 office.	 Over	 half	 of	 the	 re-elected	 mayors	 in	 2000	 were	 a	 candidate	 again	 in	 the	
foreseeable	 future,	 slightly	 fewer	 than	 first-term	mayors	 in	2000.	 In	 fact,	 close	 to	47%	of	 re-
Estimate 95%	CI p -value BW N	(treat) N	(control)
Dependent	variable:	%	of	schools	with	libraries
Full	sample 0.97 [-2.68;		5.46] 0.50 14.6 1,826 1,523
KT's	sample -1.03 [-4.58;		2.76] 0.63 13.5 2,353 1,840
Sample	not	matched -5.45 [-13.76;		1.16] 0.10 12.3 561 435
Dependent	variable:	%	of	schools	with	labs
Full	sample 1.67 [-1.29;		5.61] 0.22 14.0 1,775 1,481
KT's	sample 1.53 [-1.09;		5.10] 0.21 12.3 2,191 1,745
Sample	not	matched -0.39 [-5.35;		4.24] 0.82 22.3 850 593
Dependent	variable:	%	of	schools	with	sports	courts
Full	sample 0.24 [-3.65;		3.74] 0.98 13.9 1,764 1,464
KT's	sample -1.27 [-4.84;		2.00] 0.42 11.6 2,088 1,677








political	 career	 of	mayors	 is	 also	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 Klašnja	 and	 Titiunik	 (2017),	 who	 also	
observe	that	a	considerable	proportion	of	re-elected	mayors	run	for	a	third-term	after	waiting	
for	at	least	one	term.	Therefore,	term-bounded	mayors	with	hopes	of	running	for	a	third	non-





















2000 68.4 57.0 46.6 66.5 52.9 42.9
2004 67.8 55.2 46.1 68.3 49.4 43.0
2008 65.0 39.6 31.6 65.8 31.3 26.5
2012 50.1 1.1


















studied.	 In	 this	 case,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 difference	was	 observed	














electoral	 accountability	models.	 Term-bounded	mayors	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 perform	differently	
from	re-election-eligible	mayors	in	their	provision	of	health	and	education	public	goods.		








incentives.	 One	 example	 is	 the	 Ibrahim	 Prize,	which	 seeks	 to	 combat	 political	 immortality	 in	
African	democracies	by	offering	$6	million	dollars	to	leaders	who	have	served	their	countries	well	
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Sugarcane	Area.	 Remote	 sensing	 data	 on	 sugarcane	 harvesting	 areas	 are	 from	 The	 Brazilian	
National	 Institute	 for	Space	Research	 (Instituto	Nacional	de	Pesquisas	Espaciais,	 INPE).	 INPE’s	









Fire	 Occurrences.	 In	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 monthly	 variation	 in	 sugarcane	 burning	 through	

























confound	 the	 results.	 The	 National	 Traffic	 Department	 (Departamento	 Nacional	 de	 Trânsito)	
provides	monthly	information	of	total	car	numbers	by	municipality,	used	as	a	proxy	for	municipal	
vehicle	emissions.	Other	environmental	factors	considered	are	weather	variables.	Weather	data	


































There	are	multiple	 sources	 for	 the	 time-varying	covariates	 included	 in	 the	 regressions.	Yearly	





































OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
-0.366 3.974*** -0.029* -0.048*** 0.642*** 0.091
(0.692) (0.713) (0.015) (0.015) (0.213) (0.155)
11.39*** 3.242 0.967*** 0.523*** 0.847*** 0.475***
(2.002) (2.535) (0.149) (0.096) (0.208) (0.143)
29.06*** 14.64 -0.055** -0.057** 1.117*** 0.341*
(8.593) (9.320) (0.022) (0.024) (0.224) (0.174)
15.44*** 9.045 0.913*** 0.484*** 1.046*** 0.972***
(5.131) (8.171) (0.152) (0.106) (0.159) (0.175)
2.231* 4.787** -0.005 -0.039* 1.159*** 0.416**
(1.346) (2.060) (0.020) (0.024) (0.224) (0.169)
4.471** 2.603 0.829*** 0.510*** 0.956*** 0.498***
(1.776) (3.215) (0.145) (0.096) (0.219) (0.150)
Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes
Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes







































A.    Impacts	on	intergovernmental
transfers,	total	revenues	and	spendings













































OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
4.495 16.59*** -0.293*** -0.247*** 1.398 0.436
(3.044) (3.427) (0.075) (0.070) (0.893) (0.635)
13.74** 8.775 1.985*** 2.039*** 2.824*** 2.367***
(13.816) (6.295) (0.641) (0.438) (0.888) (0.605)
126.72** 47.17*** -0.481*** -0.382*** 3.827*** 2.576***
(42.931) (24.919) (0.109) (0.118) (0.948) (0.705)
58.47** 0.255 1.899*** 1.826*** 3.516*** 4.267***
(29.121) (11.947) (0.666) (0.483) (0.632) (0.706)
8.839 10.61*** -0.359*** -0.315** 3.962*** 2.594***
(7.232) (3.848) (0.113) (0.135) (0.941) (0.688)
22.77** -6.695 1.542** 1.973*** 3.156*** 1.656***
(11.099) (4.991) (0.633) (0.459) (0.891) (0.612)
Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes Term	dummies Yes Yes
Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes Municipal	FE Yes







































A.    Impacts	on	intergovernmental
transfers,	total	revenues	and	spendings
B.    Impacts	on	health C.    Impacts	on	school	infrastructure	and	
technology
Dep.	Variable Dep.	Variable Dep.	Variable
